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It has been observed that, before deciding between alternatives, people often 
enumerate the possible outcomes of choosing each alternative. They give each 
outcome a value representing its desirability, and often form some sort of 
estimate of the probability of occurrence of each outcome. Scientists have long 
believed that it should be possible to predict the direction of decision on the 
basis of these estimates of the value and probability of outcomes. Several 
models for making such predictions have been proposed (for example, Bernoulli, 
1954; Edwards, 1955) based on the concept that people choose the alternative 
with the greatest expectation (the sum over outcomes of the probability times 
the value of each outcome). These models are weak because they can be made 
to predict such a wide range of behavior that it is difficult to design a crucial 
experiment. This weakness has led us to seek new directions for model build- 
ing. 
Two concepts upon which such a revision might be based are suggested in 
the current literature, both concerning elements of risk in alternatives: (1) 
“probability preferences,” the concept that people are more attracted to cer- 
tain probabilities of winning or losing than to others (Edwards, 1953); and 
(2) “variance preferences,” the concept that people prefer certain dispersions 
of values of possible outcomes (Fisher, 1906; Allais, 1953). The present ex- 
periment was designed to find out whether probability and variance preferences 
exist and to discover any interactions that may occur between them. I n  addi- 
tion, a model of variance preferences was tested that made more specific pre- 
dictions than the expected utility interpretation (Bernoulli, 1954), a version of 
the expected value model. 
An earlier report on this study has already been published (Coombs and 
Pruitt, 1960). In the present paper, the model for preferential choice behavior 
will be reviewed and the earlier report summarized. Then some additional 
analyses will be presented concerning inconsistency and transitivity of prefer- 
ence, group scales, and sex differences in probability and variance preferences. 
A MODEL FOR VARIANCE PREFERENCES 
The model is based upon a theory of preferential choice and the unfolding 
technique discussed in detail elsewhere (Coombs, 1952). Consider a set of 
alternatives, each having two outcomes at  probabilities p and q respectively 
and all alternatives having the same expected value. The amount of variance 
of each alternative may be considered a point on a line or continuum of vari- 
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ance.* Assuming that an individual has an ideal variance, corresponding to 
a point on this same continuum, and that he prefers, of any two variances, the 
one nearer his ideal variance, then his preference ordering of the alternatives 
is the rank order of the alternatives obtained by folding this scale at his ideal 
point: the alternatives being ranked in order of increasing absolute distance 
from his ideal point. It will be convenient to speak of the variance scale gener- 
ically as a joint scale or J scale (both stimulus points and the ideal points of 
individuals are located on it); and the preference ordering of an individual, 
which is a folded J scale, will be called an I scale. 
The order of the 
midpoints from left to right on the J scale is determined in part by the relative 
distances between the stimuli. For example, if the distance between the first 
two stimuli, A and B, is greater than the distance between the next two stimuli, 
C and D, that is, if a > m, then the midpoint of stimuli A and D precedes 
the midpoint of stimuli B and C. The J scale is divided into segments that 
are bounded by the midpoints. To each such segment there corresponds a 
unique ordering of the absolute distances of the stimuli from any point in the 
segment. This ordering is, by hypothesis, the preference ordering of an in- 
dividual whose ideal point lies in that segment. 
It is evident that while the stimuli may be in the same rank order on the J 
scale for different individuals, the relative distances between the stimuli may 
not be the same if the measures of the stimuli are subjective rather than ob- 
jective. A consequence of this is that the order of the midpoints may be dif- 
ferent for different individuals, and the sets of preference orderings correspond- 
ing to the different orders of midpoints will not be completely identical. I t  is 
convenient, therefore, to make the following distinction: if the order of the 
midpoints appears to be the same for all individuals, the J scale is called a 
“quantitative J scale” (that is, at least a common ordered-metric scale), whereas 
if the midpoint order is not the same but only the rank order of the stimuli, 
the J scale is called a “qualitative J scale” (that is, a t  most, a common ordinal 
scale). 
I n  summary, a preference ordering of an individual, called an I scale, is re- 
garded as a folded J scale. If a set of preference orderings, obtained from a 
number of individuals, may be unfolded to construct a J scale with no contra- 
dictory order relations on intervals between stimuli, the J scale is called a 
quantitative J scale. If the set of I scales may be unfolded to construct a J 
scale on which only the order of the stimuli is common, the J scale is called a 
qualitative J scale. 
METHOD 
Consider the midpoints between stimuli on the J scale. 
The stimuli were two-outcome bets, such as the following: 1/3 chance to win 
50 cents, and 2/3 chance to lose 25 cents. All bets had an expected value of 
zero. Sets I, 11, and I11 each con- 
tained 6 bets that differed in variance but had the same probability of winning. 
In  set I, P = 1/3; in set 11, P = 1/2; and in set 111, P = 2/3. The same six 
* In  constructing the stimuli of this experiment, variance was defined as V = pq(e - b)*. 
However, any measure of dispersion is admissible under the model as a definition of variance. 
The bets were organized into five sets. 
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variance levels were used in all three sets: $0.12, 0.30, 1.00, 5.00, 25.00, and 
100.00. Sets IV and V each contained 5 bets that differed in probability of 
winning but had the same variance. The variance of set IV was $1.00; of set 
V, $25.00. The five differing probabilities were 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3 and 5/6. 
Sets I, 11, and I11 were used to study variance preferences under constant 
probability treatment; sets IV and V were used to study probability preferences 
under constant variance treatment. Within each set the bets were exhaustively 
paired, and each pair was presented 8 times. 
The bets were given to the subjects in dittoed booklets constructed so that 
one replication on all pairs was completed before the next was started. The 
Ss were told to choose, in each pair, the bet they “would prefer to play” and 
to indicate this decision by making a check in a box beside the bets. Ninety- 
nine students at  the University of Michigan served as subjects. 
SUMMAKY OH FINDINGS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED 
Consislency and Transitivily of Preference 
An information measure was used to eliminate the few Ss in each set who 
were essentially random in their choices. This measure provided a convenient 
index number to characterize an individual’s degree of inconsistency of choice 
in each set of stimuli. Comparison of these indices across sets of stimuli re- 
vealed that individual differences in inconsistency are statistically significant 
and moderate in magnitude. 
Weak stochastic transitivity was tested and found to be satisfied for most 
individuals. When this condition is satisfied, the bets can be simply ordered 
from left to right for each individual so that each bet is preferred at  least one 
half the time to any bet to the right of it. This is taken to be his preference 
ordering or I scale. 
Unfolding Analysis of Preferences 
Variance preferences. The preference orderings ( I  scales) for each set of 
stimuli were unfolded, and a best quantitative J scale was constructed. In  all 
three sets (I, 11, and 111), the vast majority of preference orderings fit the same 
quantitative J scale, and most of those that did not fit deviated in minor ways, 
apparently as a result of inconsistency. Thus the results gave strong support 
to the proposed model of variance preferences. However, it was not possible 
to answer with assurance the question whether a common quantitative or only 
a common qualitative J scale of variance underlies choice. Although the 
findings seem to support the former conclusion, this might have resulted from 
the choice of stimuli. 
Again the preference orderings were unfolded for 
each set. However, in this case, only about 60 per cent of the cases in each 
set fitted the same yuantit;ttive J scale, a scale of increasing probability of 
winning. In  most of the preference orderings that did not fit, the trouble 
seemed to lie with bets at 1/2 chance of winning, which were too much preferred. 
When these bets were eliminated from the analysis, a much larger proportion 
of the cases fitted the same quantitative J scale of increasing probability of 
winning. 
Probability preferences. 
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For almost every individual, the probability preference patterns a t  the two 
levels of variance (sets IV and V) were remarkably similar, suggesting that 
probability preferences are stable in the face of changing variance. On the 
other hand, an individual’s variance preferences were often quite different a t  
different probability treatments (sets I, 11, and 111). These differences were 
largely a function of probability preferences: a t  probability levels that people 
preferred (as shown by their behavior in sets IV and V) they preferred more 
variance. 
Variance preferences Probability preferences 
TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF H WITHIN STIXULUS ETS ____ 
I Stimulus sets* 


































































* The entcees in all but the bottom row refer to  number of Ss. 
t _Higher H indicates greater inconsistency. 
1 is a mean H. 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Inconsistency of Preference 
The obtained distribution of the information measure of inconsistency, H, is 
given in TABLE 1. The average degree of inconsistency for each of the stimulus 
sets is contained in the bottom row of the table, indicating that probability 
preferences were most inconsistent, variance preferences at  P’s of 1/3 and 2/3 
next most inconsistent, and variance preferences at  1/2 most consistent. 
In a previous study of inconsistency of preferences (Coombs, 1958) it was 
shown that laterality of stimuli on the J scale relative to an individual’s ideal 
affected the order of magnitude of his inconsistency. For individuals toward 
the extreme of a J scale the pairs of stimuli are predominantly unilateral, and 
for individuals with intermediate ideals, there are more bilateral pairs. Vari- 
ability in the location of an individual’s ideal inflates the inconsistency of bi- 
lateral judgments but has no effect on unilateral judgments. Since all individ- 
uals are assumed to have variable ideals, one would expect the inconsistency 
measure of an individual’s preference to be higher the nearer he is to the middle 
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of the J scale. These conclusions are borne out by the results presented in 
TABLE 2. Stimulus sets I, 11, and I11 have 6 stimuli each, designated A 
to F in order of increasing variance, in this table. Sets I V  and V have only 
5 stimuli, and the symbols A to E correspond to the probabilities 1/6 to 5/6 
respectively. .It is evident that, for each set of stimuli, inconsistency is great- 
est for individuals centrally located on the J scale and diminishes toward either 
end. 
TABLE 2
RELATION OF INCONSISTENCY TO IDEAL 
- ~ . _ _  - .~ ~ .~ 










I -  ~~ 
I I1 I11 IV V 
______ 
- - - - 
fi' M d H t N t  k M d h  N M d H  N H M d H  N fi M d H  N 
--_p---_____----- 
0.2157 0.1630 34 0,1802 0.1450 lX 0.2582 0.1948 16 0.4070 0.3442 33 0.4566 0.4895 31 
0.4045 0.3959 4 0,2167 0,2189 4 0.3500 0.3841 13 0.6252 0.5807 3 0.6884 0.7401 4 
0.4520 0.4979 16 0.2846 0.2657 11 0.5689 0.5743 8 0.5231 0.5173 21 0.5366 0.5295 15 
0.4884 0,4824 1 2  0.4138 0.4273 12 0,5188 0.5452 14 0.4288 0.4341 9 0.4512 0.4053 6 
0.4586 0.4471 9 0.2547 0,2627 15 0.3626 0.3472 5 0.2978 0.3253 29 0.3341 0.3397 38 
0.2112 0.2169 17 0.1095 0.0362 36 0.2359 0.1812 37 
-. ~- ~. 
Strong Stochastic Transitivity 
Whether inconsistent preferential choices satisfy strong stochastic transi- 
Strong stochastic transitivity (s.s.t.) is defined as tivity is of some interest. 
follows for any triple (a ,  b, c): 
P(a,b) 3 0.5 and P(b,c) 3 0.5 <=> P(a,c)  3 max (P(a ,b) ,  P(b,c))  
It is clear that data satisfying this condition would also satisfy the condition 
for weak stochastic transitivity. The distinction is made clear in this example. 
Suppose that P(a,b) = 0.60 and P(b,c) = 0.70. If P(a,c) is a t  least 0.50 then 
weak stochastic transitivity is satisfied by the ordering abc. Strong stochastic 
transitivity requires that P(a,c) be a t  least 0.70. I t  is obvious that a monotone 
transformation of inconsistency into psychological distance, as in the Thurstone 
(1927) and Luce (1959) models, requires strong stochastic transitivity. 
While no simple statistical test exists for testing whether the data of this 
experiment satisfy strong stochastic transitivity, a simple tabulation of the 
degree to which they do is of interest. This tabulation is presented in TABLE 
3. Strong stochastic transitivity is satisfied by only a small number of those 
subjects whose preference orderings satisfy weak stochastic transitivity (column 
6) .  It must be kept in mind that each pairwise probability is based on only 
eight observations and it is to be expected that even if strong stochastic transi- 
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91 31 1820 308 0.17 5.13 
8.5 14 1700 4.53 0.27 6.38 
89 18 890 219 0.25 3.08 
88 13 880 243 0.28 3.24 
tivity held in principle, a certain number of Ss would fail to satisfy it. Un- 
fortunately no statistical test may readily be made of whether the observed 
number is a significant departure: one only forms the impression that this may 
be so. 
Further evidence is contained in the number of triples that fail to satisfy 
strong stochastic transitivity. I n  stimulus sets I, 11, and 111, there are 20 
triples imbedded in the weak stochastic ordering of the 6 stimuli in each set. 
In  sets IV and V, with 5 stimuli, there are 10 triples in each. The failure of 
an individual’s ordering to satisfy strong stochastic transitivity is due to the 
failure of one or more of these triples. Column c of TABLE 3 contains the total 
number of triples, in each stimulus set, multiplied by the number of Ss. Col- 
umn d gives the number of such triples that fail to satisfy strong stochastic 
transitivity and column e indicates the proportion. It is apparent that, on 
the average, about 25 per cent of all triples fail to satisfy strong stochastic 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF Ss AND TRIPLES SATISFYING STRONG STOCHASTIC TRANSITIVITY 
- 
Stimulus set 
I 1 86 1 9 1 1720 1 442 1 0.26 1 5.74 
(a) Total number of Ss satisfying weak stochastic transitivity. 
(b)  Total number of Ss satisfying strong stochastic transitivity. 
(c )  Total number of triples in the weak stochastic orderings. 
(d) Total number of triples failing to satisfy strong stochastic transitivity. 
(e) Proportion of triples failing to satisfy strong stochastic transitivity. 
(f) Mean number of triples failing to satisfy strong stochastic transitivity for those Ss 
who depart from strong stochastic transitivity. 
transitivity. For those Ss who fail to satisfy strong stochastic transitivity, 
the average number of triples in their rank order that violate this condition 
is given in the last column of the table. This indicates that failure to satisfy 
strong stochastic transitivity is not a consequence of just one or two triples 
but is perhaps a significant departure. 
Considerations of the laterality of stimuli on the J scale relative to an in- 
dividual’s ideal (Coombs, 1958) also suggest that strong stochastic transitivity 
would be less often satisfied by people whose ideals are nearer the middle of 
the distribution. Rather than present all the results in detail a summary is 
contained in TABLE 4. All variance preference I scales are divided into three 
groups, those beginning with one of the end stimuli (A or F) and those begin- 
ning with an intermediate stimulus. The number of such preference scales 
and the number of triples in their preference Ecales that satisfy strong stochas- 
tic transitivity are presented in TABLE 4. As is evident, the expectation is 
borne out. The results on probability preferences show the same trend, but 
not as strongly, probably due to the fact that there are fewer stimuli (and hence 
less effect of laterality), and because of the strong preference for P = 1/2. 
790 Annals New York Academy of Sciences 
Group Preferences 
Preference scales based on the pooled data for all individuals in a stimulus 
set are of some interest. A group preference scale may be constructed by ma- 
jority choice on each pair if weak stochastic transitivity holds for the group, 
with each individual getting one vote on each pair. The result is a rank order 
that is a maximum likelihood preference scale for the entire group. The re- 
sults are presented in TABLE 5. 
Each of these group scales may be seen to correspond to an I scale and the 
corresponding I scale number may be obtained by counting the number of 
- 
a b C d 
A 64 14 0.219 1280 
B to E 106 7 0.066 2120 
F 83 32 0.386 1660 
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midpoints crossed to obtain the group scale and adding one. These numbers 
are given in the last column of the table. It is evident that, as a group, maxi- 
mum variance is preferred at  50-50 odds and more variance is preferred a t  
favorable than a t  unfavorable odds. At higher variance the group tends to 
prefer odds more in their favor, although the prior analysis of variance (Coombs 
and Pruitt, 1960) suggests that this is not a significant difference. I n  all cases 
the group scales are folded J scales and are different under different treatments. 
Another way of characterizing the preferences of a group is through the dis- 
tribution of the ideals (first choices) of its members. Such distributions are 
shown in the histograms of FIGURES 1 and 2. I n  all cases it will be seen that 
the distributions are U-shaped, with roughly one third of the subjects favoring 
each of the two extreme stimuli and one third favoring the intermediate stimuli. 
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A method frequently used for obtaining a group scale is to determine the 
total number of times each stimulus has been preferred in its pairwise presen- 
tation with all others. This vote-count method for preferential choice has 
been shown to be not independent of other alternatives (Coombs, 1958) when 
preferences are generated from a joint scale, and it has not been used here. 
A B C D L F  
p= I/3 
n 
A B C D E  
p = 1/2 
1 
1 
A B C D E  
p = 2/3 
FIGURE 1. Frequency of first choices in variance preferences. 





1/6 1/3 1/2 2/5 5/6 
L O W  VA R IAN CE- UlGU VARIANCE- 
FIGURE 2. Frequency of first choices in probability preferences. 
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Sex Differences 
Inconsistency. I n  TABLE 6 is shown the mean H for men and women sepa- 
rately on variance and probability preferences, and TABLE 7 contains an anal- 
ysis of variance. I t  is clear that the men are more consistent than the women 
in their preference behavior in the case of both variance and probability pref- 
erences. There is no significant interaction between sex and treatments in 
the case of either variance or probability preferences. 
Transitiviiy. These differences are not worth reporting in detail. There 
are slightly more intransitive I scales, and I scales with ties, for women than 
for men, but these may be attributed to the greater inconsistency of the women. 
A distribution of the first choices of men and women in their 








- ~_ -~ _ .  
Stimulus sets 
I 11 111 IV V 
0.3203 0.1902 0.3114 0.3834 0.3803 
0.4025 0.2570 0 4083 0.4708 0 4893 
__ -____ 
scale of variance, whereas men are more evenly distributed. This is borne out 
in the 3 fourfold tables presented in TABLE 8. 
The probability preferences also present a trend in sex differences, and the 
relevant data are contained in TABLE 9. Women tend to prefer “fair” bets 
and positively-skewed bets more than men, whereas the men seem to prefer 
the negatively-skewed bets more: these are the “almost sure things” with small 
probability of a large loss. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Findings on variance preferences give strong support to a model which as- 
serts that, at  each probability of winning, the individual has an ideal level of 
variance and will choose, of any two levels of variance, that which is closer to 
his ideal. A similar model for probability (skewness) preferences appears to 




MS F df 
. 
Sexes 1 0.4872 4.091* 
Error 97 0.1191 
__ 
Probability preferences 
df M.5 F 
-~ 
1 0.4561 4.925* 
97 0.0926 
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I I1 
Male Female Male Female 
__ 
_-__ ____- 
27 24 28 
13 28 13 
A vast proportion of the Ss were significantly consistent in their preferences 
and exhibited weak stochastic transitivity. On the other hand, strong sto- 
chastic transitivity was not met in most cases. Inconsistency of preferences 
and failure to satisfy strong stochastic transitivity were observed to be greater 
for individuals whose ideals are intermediate on the J scale, compared with 
those whose ideals are extreme. This is to be expected from the effect of lat- 






SEX DIFFERENCES IN VARIANCE PREFERENCES 
~~ __ 






x2 = 4.125 
ldf P < 0.05 ldf P < 0.05 
x2 = 5.011 
TABLE 9 
SEX DIFFERENCES IN PROBABILITY PREFERENCES 
______. -__ 
Stimulus sets 
V: High variance IV: Low variance I 
1/6 and 1/3 
2/'3 and 5/6 
1/2 
Test I ____ 
Male I Female 1 Male 1 Female 
x9 = 6.71, 2 d j  x2 = 8.51, 2 df 
P < 0.05 P < 0.02 
Group scales based on majority choice were folded J scales, and they revealed 
that for the group as a whole, maximum variance was preferred a t  odds of one 
half, and more variance was preferred a t  favorable than a t  unfavorable odds; 
a t  the higher variance level the group tended to prefer odds in their favor. 
Distributions of first-choice were U-shaped for all sets of stimuli. 
Women differed from men in that they (1) were more inconsistent, (2) were 
correspondingly less often transitive, (3) preferred intermediate variance more 
often than men, and (4) preferred even money and long shot bets more than 
men. I t  is not clear whether women's greater inconsistency is due to the lat- 
erality effect, in that their ideals tend to be intermediate, or whether they may 
be said to be intrinsically more inconsistent in this kind of behavior. 
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